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Abstract
In this work, we consider Corporate Governance (CG) ties among companies from a multi-
ple network perspective. Such a structure naturally arises from the close interrelation between
the Shareholding Network (SH) and the Board of Directors network (BD). In order to cap-
ture the simultaneous effects of both networks on CG, we propose to model the CG multiple
network structure via tensor analysis. In particular, we consider the TOPHITS model, based
on the PARAFAC tensor decomposition, to show that tensor techniques can be successfully
applied in this context. By providing some empirical results from the Italian financial market
in the univariate case, we then show that a tensor–based multiple network approach can reveal
important information.
Keywords: Multiple Networks, Tensor Analysis, Corporate Governance
1 Introduction
The structure and dynamics of complex systems has been one of the hottest research topics
in the recent years (see for example [23], [3], [21], [16], [48], [1]). A complex system can be
described as a network whose nodes are the basic units of the system and the edges represent the
link or relationship between the units, assuming that the edges embed all connections between
nodes. Univariate link analysis concentrates on a single link type. For example, to analyze
the structure of the Web, both HITS (Hyperlink–Induced Topic Search) ([33]) and Page Rank
([39]) decompose an adjacency matrix that represents the hyperlink structure. A review with
some further results that deals with the comparison of such measures can be found in [40].
However, the relationships between units can be many and of different type, generating
a network for each attribute of the nodes. When many attributes are assigned to n nodes,
it becomes more and more important to analyze the resulting link structure, incorporating all
links simultaneously. Tensor analysis is a technique to capture multilinear structures, when data
have more than one mode. It is accomplished through matrix decomposition on a multi–way
array. An increasing research stream nowadays is oriented towards the study and application
of tensor analysis in system theory, signalling and circuit theory ([35], [34], [19], [30]).
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An adjacency tensor is formed by stacking the adjacency matrix for each attribute link to
form a three way array. For multiple linkages, a three way array can be used, where the frontal
slices describe the adjacency matrix of each single attribute.
The concept of centrality can also be extended from the univariate to the multivariate
case. In the univariate case, hubs and authorities values are reciprocally defined in a recursive
scheme that is the basis of HITS algorithm ([33]). In the multivariate case, the HITS model is
generalized to the TOPHITS model ([34]). Moreover, hub and authorities find an interpretation
related to the multiple linkages. Authorities and hubs are calculated accordingly through three–
way Parallel Factor Analysis (PARAFAC), the higher order analogous of SVD ([26], [35]).
In TOPHITS, the PARAFAC decomposition provides a three–way decomposition that yields
hub, authority and attribute scores. The attributes that have the largest score are the most
descriptive.
An alternative approach to analyze multi–way data is found in multiplex networks (see,
for instance, [46], [4]). However, stacking the data in a matrix results in loss of information.
Thus, the multiplex analysis is forcibly limited and requires more research to be effective ([4]).
In [9], the author proposes a statistical mechanics framework to describe multiple networks
with a significant overlap of the links in the different layers. In [10], the importance of using
appropriate weighted measures of multiplex networks is stressed.
Tensor analysis is employed in a variety of different fields. For example, bibliometric data
can be analyzed through the body of work, distinguishing between papers written by different
author and predicting in which journal the paper is published ([22]). Recent applications of
higher order tensors have appeared in text analysis of web pages ([34], [35]), spectroscopic
fluorescence and wavelet-transformed multi-channel EEG ([24]).
To our knowledge, tensor analysis has never been applied to economic or financial networks.
We claim that the tensor approach can contribute substantially in the interpretation of Cor-
porate Governance (CG thereafter), a central research topic in both theoretical and empirical
financial literature. An exhaustive survey on relevant CG issues is presented in [45]. As it is
well known, CG studies interrelations between ownership and control of a firm. In the univari-
ate case (i.e. considering only one network), many contributions can be found in the study of
either Shareholding Network (SH) or Board of Directors (BD) network ([5], [20], [27], and [6]).
However, limited research has been done on the joint effect of the two networks considered to-
gether. For instance, in [41], the authors find a remarkable overlap of the community structure
in both networks. Stockholders invest their money in a company whose strategic decisions are
taken by top management. Therefore, by analyzing simultaneously the two networks, tensor
decomposition can contribute substantially to the interpretation of CG. This may give a unique
perspective on the relevance of management rather than ownership in the company’s policy.
In this paper, a multi–way analysis on SH and BD networks is performed on the CG multi–
way array. In the CG multi–way array, hubs and authorities will also be found. The results
will be contrasted with the univariate case. Dominant subgroups will be found and interpreted.
Italy is taken as a case study.
The paper is structured as follows. Corporate governance is introduced in Section 2, with
a particular emphasis to Italy. Basic notions on graphs and tensor analysis are illustrated in
Section 3. Description of data base and data processing issues are in Section 4 while results are
discussed in Section 5. A summary of results and conclusions are in Section 6.
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2 Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance (CG) studies how to provide shareholders a certain degree of control on
strategic actions undertaken by managers and how to measure their effectiveness and loyalty.
It is crucial to detect which decisions might end up affecting, in a negative way, firms’ market
value and, consequently, shareholders wealth. Then a main goal of CG is to develop and propose
practical rules that allow shareholders to enforce proper company management.
The analysis of CG in Italy is interesting for a number of reasons. First of all, recently, Italy
issued rules on CG. In [37] and [38] the effect of the so–called 1998 “Riforma Draghi” whose
aim was to give more power and financial protection to minority shareholders is analyzed. In
particular, in most Italian listed companies the existence of a main shareholder that acts as
a blockholder (i.e. a shareholder or a small group of shareholders that substantially influence
company’s decisions) can be found. Moreover, the Italian bank Mediobanca is linked, via many
inter-corporate shareholdings, to most private groups.
Further, as of 2004, 60% of listed companies were controlled by a shareholders’ agreement
(patto di sindacato) capable to put in the hands of a small groups of shareholders (either the
state or some capitalistic families) the full control of a company [38]. Just to mention a very
recent event, in October 2013 the ’patto di sindacato’ that controlled RCS Mediagroup (an
important media company owner of ’Corriere della Sera’, the most popular Italian newspaper)
was broken after having lasted since 1984. Involved in this agreement were (among others) the
Agnelli family, Banca Intesa, Fondiaria-Sai and Assicurazioni Generali, that are very prominent
players in the Italian capitalist system. Furtermore, a separation between control and ownership
is reachable through the so called pyramidal groups if the actual number of held shares is
relatively small [37], [32].
These ties might be at least partially affected by article 36 of the “Decreto salva Italia”
that, since the beginning of 2012, prohibits interlocking (i.e. directors sitting in more than
one board) between Italian banks, financial and insurance companies. The purpose of this rule
is to avoid potentially anti–competitive behaviors and to reduce the usage of private financial
information for speculative actions.
Within the European context, [25] analyzes companies’ ownership in Western Europe, show-
ing how many “widely held” or “family controlled” companies are present in financial markets.
A comparison of the BD connections within Blue chips companies in Italy, France, Germany,
United Kingdom, and United States is done in [44]. Through explanatory data analysis, it
is established that the Italian case, as well as the French and German ones, is characterized
by a small group of top managers sitting in several company boards, enforcing consequently
strong ties between firms. Furthermore the Italian listed and unlisted companies are heavily
characterized by a strong ownership concentration [8].
In [7], using descriptive analysis, a connection between corporate governance structure and
firm performance in Italy is found. Even if under both a legal and an economical point of
view between 1990 and 2005 there have been major changes into the Italian environment,
only limited shifts toward more efficient control and ownerships structures can be detected. If
minority shareholders do not have an adequate control on companies, blockholders can force
managers to undertake business that are too risky ending up in a potential loss in company
value. On the other hand, if most companies are connected in shareholding terms they can
deploy collusive behavior. This, in the short run, can foster gains, but in the long run leads to
a reduction in innovation and competitiveness.
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In this paper, we analyze the complex structure of Corporate Governance of companies listed
on the Italian Stock Exchange. To do this, we consider the tensor composed of the SH and
the BD networks. This gives a unique approach to understand the relevance of ownership and
management on the company’s market performance. In this context, a question naturally arises.
Are market price co–movements affected by a common CG structure? In order to provide a
quantitative answer to this question, we consider a third network layer, the correlation network,
obtained by constructing companies whose returns on price correlations is above a certain
threshold (0.65).
3 Methodology
3.1 Preliminaries
We quickly recall some standard definitions and results about graph theory. For more details
refer to [29]. A graph G = (V,E) consists of a set V of n vertices and a set E of m edges. Let
us denote with |V | = n and |E| = m the cardinality of the sets V and E respectively. A weight
wij , i, j = 1, . . . , n, is possibly associated to each edge (i, j), in this case a weighted (or valued)
graph is defined.
The degree di of a vertex i (i = 1, ..., n) is the number of edges incident to it. A directed
graph (digraph) is a graph in which all the edges are directed from one vertex to another. In
a directed graph the in–degree of a vertex i is the number of arcs directed from other vertices
to i and the out–degree of a vertex i is the number of arcs directed from i to other vertices.
A graph is connected if for each pair of nodes i and j, (i, j = 1, 2, ..., n) , there is a path
from i to j. A digraph is strongly connected if for each pair of vertices there is a directed path
connecting them.
The binary adjacency matrix of a graph G = (V,E) is the nonnegative n-square matrix
A = [Aij ], (i, j = 1, 2, ..., n) representing the adjacency relationships between vertices of G:
the off–diagonal elements aij of A are equal to 1 if vertices i and j are adjacent, 0 otherwise.
Let {λ1, λ2, ..., λn} be the set of the eigenvalues of A and ρ = maxi |λi| its spectral radius. If
G = (V,E) is undirected, it is known that A is symmetric and its eigenvalues are real. When
G = (V,E) is undirected and connected, A is irreducible, i.e. for every pair of indices i and j,
there exists a natural number r such that (Ar)ij 6= 0. If G = (V,E) is a digraph, its adjacency
matrix A is in general asymmetric; moreover, A is irreducible if and only if G is strongly
connected. If A is a non–negative and irreducible matrix, it is well known that a positive
eigenvector, called the Perron or principal eigenvector, corresponds to the spectral radius of A.
In the case of a weighted graph without loops, i.e. without any edge connecting a vertex to
itself, its adjacency matrix, denoted by W (the weighted adjacency matrix) has zero diagonal
elements, and nonnegative real off–diagonal entries.
Graphs with more than one type of link, also referred to as multigraphs or multiple networks,
can be usefully described by tensors and their decompositions.
Two useful concepts for multiple networks analysis are the intersection and union networks.
Given K networks Gk = (V,Ek), whose respective unweighted adjacency matrices are Ak =
[Ak(i, j)], k = 1, . . . ,K, the intersection network G∩ = (V,E∩), is defined as follows: nodes i
and j are linked in G∩ if and only ∀k, Ak(i, j) = 1. The adjacency matrix A∩ of the intersection
network can be easily obtained through the Hadamard product A∩ = A1 ◦A2 ◦ . . . ◦AK , that
is the entry–wise product, between the K adjacency matrices of the corresponding univariate
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networks. The union network G∪ = (V,E∪) is defined as follows: two nodes i and j are linked
in G∪ if there exists a link between the two nodes at least in one of the K networks. The
adjacency matrix of the union network A∪ is obtained by summing up A1,A2, . . . ,AK and
binarizing the resulting matrix. The union network allows to check the presence of any possible
link between nodes.
In the following part of this section, some basic concepts about tensors are given (for more
details see [35]). Tensors are multidimensional arrays. A multiple network, with n nodes and
l link types, can be represented by a three way (or third order) tensor A of size n × n × l,
whose the (i, j, k) element, denoted by Aijk, is different from zero if there is a link of type l
connecting node i to node j. A slice of a tensor A is the matrix obtained by fixing the third
index. In particular, a frontal slice of a tensor corresponds to the adjacency matrix of one type
of network.
The Frobenius norm of a tensor A of size n× n× l is defined as:
‖A‖ =
 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
l∑
k=1
a2ijk
1/2 .
A is a rank-one tensor if it can be written as the outer product of vectors. For instance, let
A be a rank–one tensor of size n× n× l, then A = u ◦ v ◦w, i.e. the (i, j, k) element of A is
given by Aijk = uivjwk, for i, j = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . , l, where u ∈ Rn,v ∈ Rn and w ∈ Rn
3.2 HITS
This section illustrates the ways in which multiple networks can be analyzed in order to identify
the key actors. We first recall the case of univariate networks, focusing in particular on centrality
[18] for undirected networks and its univariate extension to the case of asymmetric, weighted
and multiple networks.
A centrality measure enhancing the importance of a node as a function of centrality of the
nodes to which it is connected, is the eigenvector centrality (see [11], [12]): the centrality of an
actor is proportional to the sum of the centralities of the neighbors. Formally, the eigencentrality
xi of the vertex vi is defined as xi = α
∑n
j=1Aijxj ; by setting α =
1
ρ , the value xi is represented
by the i-th component of the Perron eigenvector x (see [28] for a review on eigencentrality and
further results).
In general, the relations between actors are directed, so that the corresponding graph is a
digraph and the adjacency matrix is asymmetric. Accordingly, the eigenvalue centrality has
to be modified to take into account this asymmetry. Two attributes are given to each node:
authority and hubness ([33]). Authority measures prestige: actors who many other actors point
to are called authorities. If a node has a high number of nodes pointing to it, it has a high
authority value and this quantifies its role as a source of information. On the contrary, a hub is
an actor referring to many authorities and its score measures acquaintance. Essentially, a good
hub points to many good authorities and a good authority is pointed to by many good hubs.
More formally, let G = (V,E) be the directed graph on n nodes modeling the network and
A(G) = [Aij ] the asymmetric adjacency matrix of G of order n. Two scores (centralities) are
associated to the i− th node: ai the authority score and hi the hub score.
These values can be reciprocally defined in a recursive scheme. This is the basis of the HITS
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algorithm (see [33]). HITS leads to authorities and hubs computed iteratively as follows:
a
(t+1)
j =
n∑
i=1
Ajih
(t+1)
i (1)
h
(t+1)
i =
n∑
j=1
Aija
(t)
j (2)
or, equivalently,
a = ATh and h = Aa,
where vectors a = [a1, . . . , an]T and h = [h1, ..., hn]T give respectively the authority and the
hub scores on all nodes. If the graph G is undirected, i.e. the adjacency matrix is symmetric,
then, for all nodes, authority and hub scores coincide.
Note that if the hub vector h is known with accuracy the authority scores can be computed
from Eq. 1, and, analogously, for the hubs scores using Eq. 2. Since this is not the case, the
idea of the HITS algorithm is to start with initial vectors a(0) and h(0) and to update hub
scores and authority scores by repeating the process.
Note that authorities scores are computed by the current hub values, which in turn are
computed from the previous authorities scores. It follows that hub and authority values are
reciprocally defined in a recursive scheme. The convergence of HITS algorithm is guaranteed by
the normalization of solutions after each iteration and by the condition λ1(ATA) > λ2(ATA),
being λ1 and λ2 the first two eigenvalues of ATA. Denoting by a(k) and h(k) authorities and
hub scores we get: h(1) = Aa(0), ĥ(1) = h(1)/
∥∥h(1)∥∥, a(1) = AT ĥ(1) and, at the t− th iteration,
αh(t) = ATAh(t−1), αa(t) = AATa(t−1), being α a normalization coefficient.
Performing power iteration method on AAT and ATA, a(t) and h(t) will converge respec-
tively to the principal eigenvectors a∗ and h∗ of the symmetric semi-positive definite matri-
ces ATA and AAT . If we consider the singular value decomposition (SVD) of A, given by
A = UDVT , it is well known that the columns of U are the eigenvectors of AAT and the
columns of V are the eigenvectors of ATA, called the left singular vectors and right singular
vectors of A, respectively. It follows that a∗ and h∗ correspond respectively to the principal
right and left singular vectors of A. Finally, considering the first K singular values of A, i.e.
σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ ... ≥ σk > 0, the matrix A can be approximated as follows [26]:
A ≈
K∑
i=1
σiu
(i) ◦ v(i)
where u(i) and v(i) are the corresponding singular vectors. x ◦ y denotes the outer product
of the two vectors x and y, i.e. (x ◦ y)ij = xiyj . The principal right and left singular vectors
a∗ and h∗ corresponds to the best rank − 1 approximation of A obtained for k = 1, so that
h∗ = u(1) and a∗ = v(1).
3.3 The TOPHITS algorithm
When dealing with multiple networks, some techniques, known as tensor decompositions, can
be successfully applied. Two major tensor decomposition methods are generally the most used:
the PARAFAC (Parallel Factor Analysis, also called Canonical Decomposition, or CP) [30] and
the Tucker decomposition (or TD, see [47]) from which many others are derived. The first one
is a form of high order extension of SVD which allows to analyze three mode data yielding both
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hubs and authority scores and considering the context (the type of relation). Kolda and Bader
[34] proposed the TOPHITS method which used the PARAFAC model to analyze a three–way
representation of data from the Web.
The TOPHITS produces sets of triplets
{
h(i),a(i), t(i)
}
, where the h and a vectors represent
hub and authority scores respectively and the t vector contains topic scores which identify the
context of the links.
Analogously to HITS, these scores can be derived iteratively as follows:
a
(t+1)
j =
n∑
i=1
l∑
k=1
Ajikh
(t+1)
i t
(t)
k , j = 1, . . . , n; (3)
h
(t+1)
i =
n∑
j=1
l∑
k=1
Aijka
(t)
j t
(t)
k , i = 1, . . . , n; (4)
t
(t+1)
k =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aijka
(t+1)
j h
(t+1)
i , k = 1, . . . , l. (5)
Following the notation in [34], let A denote the n× n× l adjacency tensor of the multiple
networks. Let Aijk = 1 if there is a relationship of type k from actor i to actor j , Aijk = 0
otherwise. If a weight is associated to each edge (i, j) in the k–th network, then we set Aijk =
w
(k)
ij .
The above equations can be written as:
h(t+1) = A ×2a(t)× 3t(t) (6)
a(t+1) = A×1h(t+1)×3t(t) (7)
t(t+1) = A×1h(t+1)×2a(t+1) (8)
where A ×ra×qt indicates that the tensor A multiplies the vectors a and t in dimensions r
and q respectively. For example, if r = 3 and q = 2, the i− th component of s = A ×3a×2t is
si =
m∑
k=1
n∑
j=1
Aijkaktj for i = 1, ..., n.
Analogously to the HITS algorithm based on the SVD matrix decomposition, the TOPHITS
algorithm based on the PARAFAC tensor decomposition reveals latent groupings of nodes that
can be associated to each factor r, but TOPHITS also includes latent information related to
the network layer ([34] for a thorough description).
Using the PARAFAC decomposition [30], the tensor A can be approximated as follows:
A ≈
R∑
r=1
λru
(r) ◦ v(r) ◦w(r) (9)
where x ◦ y ◦ z denotes the three way outer product of the three vectors x, y and z i.e.
(x ◦ y ◦ z)ijk = xiyjzk, and λr ∈ RR is a scaling factor (see [35] for a detailed discussion).
As before, under proper hypotheses, Equations 6, 7 and 8 converge to the best rank − 1
approximation of A obtained for k = 1, so that h∗ = u(1) and a∗ = v(1) and t∗ = w(1).
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The PARAFAC can be seen as a special case of TD, which is a higher–order extension of
Factor Analysis and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The TD features a core tensor,
whose entries indicate the level of interaction between the various components. More precisely,
in the three way case, using the TD, a tensor A of size I × J × K can be approximated as
follows (for more details see [35]):
A ≈
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
R∑
r=1
gpqru
(p) ◦ v(q) ◦w(r) =
= G×1 U×2 V ×3 W
or, elementwise:
Aijk ≈
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
R∑
r=1
Gpqruip vjqwkr (10)
for i = 1, . . . , I, j = 1, . . . , , J, k = 1, . . . ,K
where U ∈ RI×P , V ∈ RJ×Q and W ∈ RK×R are the component matrices and G ∈ RP×Q×R
is called the core tensor. G×nU denotes the n mode product of the tensor G with the matrix
U. Note that the Tucker Decomposition is not unique and the component matrices are usually
orthogonal.
4 The tensor of Corporate Governance in the Italian finan-
cial market
Companies in a financial market can be connected in many ways, e.g. sharing a common
industrial sector or having a similar price dynamics. Doubtless, the most relevant connection
is given by the corporate control. Holding companies possess an influential control in term
of corporate governance on the controlled companies. Corporate governance is the system
by which companies are directed and controlled and involves a set of relationships between a
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders [15]. We examine
two levels of such a system: the shareholding structure and the board structure in the year
2013 in Italy. Both levels imply a pairwise relationship between companies, thus leading to two
networks: the shareholding network (SH) and the interlocking board of directors network (BD)
([17], [43], [20]). We consider the dataset of 273 quoted companies on the Italian Stock Market
(sources: Borsa Italiana and Bloomberg).
Networks along the tensor are defined as A(:, :, k), where the index k stands for the k–th
network in the system (or, alternatively, the k–th layer in the multiple network). Figure 1
shows the multiple network structure represented as a tensor:
Shareholding network (SH)
The first layer/network is the Shareholding Network (SH), defined as follows:
A(i, j, 1) = percentage of (quoted) company j held by (quoted) company i.
All relative amounts below the threshold of 2% are discarded. 2% is the limit imposed by
the Italian Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB) to consider, for a listed
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Figure 1: The Corporate Governance multiple network represented as a tensor
company, a relevant shareholder. Any subject holding more than 2% of a listed company must
inform CONSOB. The SH network is weighted and directed, with rational weights between 0
and 1 [20].
The SH network considers quoted holdings only. In the Italian market, a significant part of
the control structure belongs to non listed companies. In fact, several non–quoted companies
hold quotas of quoted companies. Hence pairs of quoted companies might be linked via an
external relationship, where the common holding company does not appear. On the other hand,
at the board level it is more frequent that commonly held companies (via an external one) share
a significant number of directors. Thus, we find extremely useful to analyze simultaneously both
networks, in order to find common patterns in the CG structure. Another feature of the Italian
market is that a strong government/public control exists in several quoted companies. The
Ministry of Finance and the former Postal Service hold important quota of very large high–cap
companies (e.g. Cassa Depositi e Prestiti vs ENI and Terna, and the Ministry of Finance vs
ENI and ENEL) as well as several municipalized companies (e.g. Comune di Milano, Roma
Capitale, Comune Reggio Emilia and many others). In this case, the holders are not quoted
and a significant quota of information is missing.
Board of directors network (BD)
The second network/layer is represented by the board of directors network, defined as
A(i, j, 2) = # of directors sitting in both i and j
The univariate BD network has been studied extensively [5] and, more recently, [27] and
[17]. The adjacency matrix contains all listed companies in the Italian Stock Exchange for the
year 2013. Isolated vertices have been excluded. The network is undirected and weighted with
integer weights. Moreover, it is not connected, characterized by a giant component and the
presence of a few hubs.
Correlation network
In addition to this, it is interesting to wonder whether similar governance structure lead to
similar co–movements in market prices. In order to quantitatively assess this, we created an
additional network layer, representing the correlations of price returns. In particular, we built a
binary network that takes values 1 when the value of the return correlation coefficient is bigger
than 0.65. In this way, we want to establish a linkage between a pair of companies only when
a significant positive correlation in the price structure occurs.
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(a) Layer 1 – SH network (b) Layer 2 – Board network
Figure 2: The SH network and the BD network (with no isolated nodes) representing the layers of
the Italian CG multiple network
The third network/layer is hence the binary correlation network defined as:
X(i, j, 3) =

1 if the value of the correlation coefficient
of price returns is bigger than 0.65
0 otherwise.
This network has been introduced to assess and quantify the effect on the Corporate Gov-
ernance structure of the movements in market prices.
4.1 Empirical data
We applied our model to Italian data. In particular, we consider 273 companies listed in the
FTSE–Italia All Share index. Data are collected from Bloomberg database. To construct the
two networks, for all the above mentioned companies, we considered the board of directors
composition as of July 2013 and the structure of shareholdings as of 16 July 2013. Finally, in
order to obtain the correlation network, we considered the time series of daily closing prices
starting from 2 May 2012 and ending at 30 April 2013 for each company.
All computations have been done by using the Matlab Tensor Toolbox Version 2.5 [36] and
the Matlab N–Way toolbox [2]. Both toolboxes provide very similar results, thus showing a
certain degree of numerical robustness of the method proposed.
4.2 Data pre–processing
Given the particular nature of the methodology hereby proposed, data had to be pre–processed
(see, for example for a discussion on this problem [34]). In particular, we had to develop a
heuristics to deal with three main problems:
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• while applying the PARAFAC algorithm to compute the TOPHITS scores for hubs/autho–
rities/layer score, an appropriate number of factors has to be found that would guarantee
a good fit while avoiding overfitting at the same time.
• given the nature of the PARAFAC algorithm, we wanted to deal with a multiple network
whose union was strongly connected and intersection was non–empty. In order to achieve
this, we reduced the nodes to 182. This allowed to find a sub-network where the union
network is strongly connected.
• creating a homogeneous weighting structure for both SH and BD. In fact, since these
two networks are different in terms of both topological structure and network density, we
needed to look for a way to make them comparable in topological terms.
In order to solve the first and third problem, after several attempts, we found a heuristic
rule that seemed to work well in this context. At first, we discarded both the self–owned shares
in the SH network, thus setting to zero the main diagonal of the first slice (we posed the main
diagonal of the second slice to zero as well). Secondly, in order to make it possible to obtain a
reasonable comparison of the topological structure of the two layers, we normalized each layer
by its Frobenius norm.
Moreover, the lack of a well established methodology for the determination of the number
of factors required further analysis. In ([14]) a test (Core Consistency Diagnostic or CORCON-
DIA) is proposed to determine whether, given a fixed number of factors, the model is better
explained by a Tucker decomposition (Eq. 10) or by a CP decomposition (Eq. 9). Such an
approach tests whether allowing for non–zero values across the off–diagonal elements of the
core tensor G in Equation 10 gives a better fit for the model. In our case, we found quite clearly
that the CORCONDIA test is consistently very close to one (i.e. a CP model provides a good
fit w.r.t. a Tucker model) for a number of factors R ≥ 3. As such, we focused on the number
of factors by taking into account both a good level of fit and parsimony. Figure 2 shows that
a good fit is achieved for R ≥ 25. After several attempts, we also noticed that the hubs and
authorities scores became stable for R ≥ 30. As such, combining this information, we decided
to set R = 30 in our analysis, which provides a good fit of 62% while keeping the number
of factors relatively low with respect to the dimensionality of the problem, still allowing for a
meaningful sub–groups identification.
Moreover, all hubs/authorities/topic scores tend not to vary for higher valuer of R (especially
for the highest–scoring companies).
As previously noted, while BD (i.e. the second layer/slice) is symmetric by construction,
SH is asymmetric and, as such, provides the reason for computing separated hubs/authorities
scores in the TOPHITS model.
5 Results
5.1 HITS
A first analysis was carried on the two univariate networks (SH and BD). For the (directed)
SH network, hubs/authorities scores have been computed, whereas, for the (undirected) BD
network, we have computed the eigencentralities. All results hereby presented (Tables 1 and 2)
are computed for each of the SCCs in each layer/network.
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Table 1: Hubs/Authorities score in the univariate network (first principal vector) for the SH network
company hubs score company authority score
Fondiaria-Sai 0.17417 Rcs Mediagroup 0.16885
Unicredit Spa 0.12595 Mediobanca 0.12645
Italmobiliare 0.11921 Risanamento Spa 0.11343
Banco Popolare S 0.1026 Gemina Spa 0.10322
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.1026 Industria E Inno 0.080684
Banca Monte Dei 0.08252 Milano Assicuraz 0.047759
Mediobanca 0.076291 Fondiaria-Sai 0.03798
Fiat Spa 0.061368 Alerion 0.032925
Pirelli & C. 0.055806 Italcementi 0.032688
Mediolanum Spa 0.041792 Mittel Spa 0.032688
Table 2: Highest eigencentrality nodes in the univariate network (first eigenvector) for the Board
network, and their degree
company eigencentrality degree
Pirelli & C. 0.034224 18
Mediobanca 0.033053 17
Italcementi 0.032149 18
Atlantia Spa 0.02823 16
Luxottica Group 0.023417 15
Generali Assic 0.020997 15
Fiat Industrial 0.020907 11
Brembo Spa 0.019704 11
Autogrill Spa 0.018285 9
Italmobiliare 0.018 9
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It is very clear that the core of shareholding in Italy is composed of banks and financial
institutions. Eight out of the ten most eigencentral (hubs) are banks or insurance companies.
Fiat and Pirelli are the only exceptions. On the side of held companies, industrial groups
emerge, Mediobanca having a prominent role as a holding and held company.
From the BD side, the picture changes completely. The industrial companies play a central
role through their directors sitting in different boards. Pirelli, the most degree central and
eigencentral, shares its directors with eighteen other companies. Moreover, Mediobanca shows
here again its central role.
5.2 TOPHITS
As mentioned in 3.2, the TOPHITS algorithm reveals triplets for hubs, authorities and layer
(network) scores. In our case, the network scores refer to either the SH or BD network, i.e. one
of the layers of the corporate governance.
As in [34], we will first refer to the dominant triplet {h(1),a(1), t(1)}, i.e. the first element
(r = 1) of the sum in Equation 9, as the dominant grouping, which refers to the most important
corporate governance group and captures the most relevant control structure in the whole
network.
The normalized layer (topic) scores in this case are 0.7582 for the SH network and 0.2418
for the Board network. In other terms, the network data structure is explained 75% by the
shareholding network and only 24% by the board network. This implies that, notwithstanding
the normalization performed in the data preprocessing, a much sparser structure (SH) carries
much more topological information than a denser one (BD).
A simple, yet interesting, economic interpretation of this is that the multiple network of
corporate governance has a very characteristic topology in its SH component which, although
sparse, has a fundamental importance in connecting the most relevant companies, and the
much denser Board network provides the actual linkages backbone amongst companies. Such a
backbone structure is denser yet less significant in capturing the most relevant ties in corporate
governance.
The hubs/authorities for the dominant grouping in the TOPHITS model reveal interesting
information as well. By taking into account the multiple ties amongst companies, those compa-
nies that have a systemic governance influence (also via indirect ties along different dimensions)
are more likely to emerge.
Table 3 show the 10 highest ranking companies in both hubs and authorities scores for r = 1.
The rankings are quite interesting, as companies that are well known for being extremely
relevant in the Italian corporate governance structure rank high. In particular, Mediobanca
ranks high in both hub and authority scores, because it is both a central player in controlling
other companies. The chain of shareholding control of Fondiaria–Sai is of particular interest.
In the univariate SH network, Fondiaria ranks first because it owns the 3.14% of Mediobanca,
2.24% of RCS Mediagroup and 4.20% of Gemina. However, in the bivariate network Fondiaria–
Sai completely disappears from the highest scoring companies, while Mediobanca reemerges as
the key hub of the network, thanks to its predominance in both network layers. On the other
hand, for other companies, the effect of boards on ownership is somehow limited. The central
companies in the univariate SH network remain central in the TOPHITS model. Exceptions
are Mediobanca, Intesa San Paolo and UniCredit, whose large boards structure make them
more relevant. Furthermore, taking into account both networks simultaneously, the influence
13
Table 3: Hubs/Authorities score (TOPHITS) (2 layers, r = 1)
company hubs score company authority score
Mediobanca 0.17674 Rcs Mediagroup 0.16773
Banco Popolare S 0.16796 Mediobanca 0.10579
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.15786 Gemina Spa 0.096294
Italmobiliare 0.15212 Risanamento Spa 0.068168
Unicredit Spa 0.14603 Mittel Spa 0.049657
Fiat Spa 0.095423 Italcementi 0.046879
Pirelli & C. 0.07785 Piquadro Spa 0.043704
Premafin Finanz 0.040173 Generali Assic 0.039667
Cattolica Assic 0.029926 Pirelli & C. 0.039256
Caltagirone Spa 0.023077 Dea Capital Spa 0.037108
of non–listed companies (not present in the SH network) but with representatives in the board
(present on the BD network) can be revealed. This is the case of Caltagirone and Premafin,
both family companies. Further assessment of the impact of holding weights will be the aim of
further research.
Since the SH network is the one ranking highest in terms of topic score (i.e. it carries
most topological structure) and it is asymmetric, it is the only layer/slice providing different
hub/authority scores. Should, in fact, the two layers be both symmetric, the hub and authority
scores would coincide.
In other words, hubs and authorities are correctly found accruing to the ownership. From
Table 3, we see once more how the Italian ownership structure is dominated by banks and,
in particular, by Mediobanca. RCS Mediagroup is a clear example of the many links among
private companies and banks. Among its main shareholders we find: Banco Popolare di Son-
drio, Fiat Spa, Fondiaria-Sai, Intesa San Paolo, Banca Italmobiliare, Mediolanum Spa, Milano
Assicurazioni, Pirelli & Co.
5.3 Sub–groups
As previously explained, the TOPHITS algorithm allows for the identification of sub–groups
of nodes in the multiple network structure. In this light, we checked the scores the different
values of r = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 30, identifying interesting sub–groups of companies that are notoriusly
known to lie within the same sphere of control on both shareholding and board structure. In
particular, we found (see Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7) interesting sub–groups for r = 6 (Caltagirone),
r = 9 (FIAT group), r = 12 (Poligrafici) and r = 17 (ENI).
Some important industrial sectors are represented: Caltagirone, active in the construction
sector and owns Vianini and Cementir is connected to the whole system through Unicredit and
Mediobanca. Poligrafici Ed. and the controller Monrif operate in publishing, printing and new
media. Eni, an ex government owned company is stil with a strong public participation, as well
as Finmeccanica. They operate in the sector of energy and mechanics, as well as most of the
companies they control.
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Table 4: TOPHITS model (2 layers, r = 6.) [Caltagirone]
company hubs score company authority score
Caltagirone Spa 0.16302 Cementir Holding 0.15222
Caltagirone Edit 0.14021 Vianini Industri 0.15214
Unicredit Spa 0.07993 Vianini Lavori 0.15214
Fondiaria-Sai 0.058213 Caltagirone Edit 0.079104
Mediobanca 0.055692 Italmobiliare 0.027755
Table 5: TOPHITS model (2 layers, r = 9.) [FIAT]
company hubs score company authority score
Fiat Spa 0.052963 Fiat Industrial 0.048148
Mediobanca 0.042861 Fiat Spa 0.034534
Rcs Mediagroup 0.036761 Fondiaria-Sai 0.03451
Fondiaria-Sai 0.033111 Brembo Spa 0.028077
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.027334 Luxottica Group 0.024689
5.4 Governance and prices
As showed above, the corporate governance topological structure can be quantified via assigning
companies scores that capture their governance relevance in the multiple network. We now
consider also the third layer: the return on prices correlation network, as described above. The
new multiple network is now composed of three layers and we again computed, analogously to
what we have previously done, the TOPHITS score.
As a first result, we noticed that the same number of factors R = 30 leads to having a
similar fit 61% with respect to the two–layer case, but the topic/layer scores change dramati-
cally: the SH network has a normalized score of 0.15, whereas the board network has a very low
score of 0.04; the score of the correlation network is very high 0.81. This shows that significant
price correlations have a very structured topology, which can be due to the contingent situa-
tion of the financial crisis (prices tend to co–move more in the same direction). The striking
result, however, is that the corporate governance structure can explain very little of a company
performance on the stock market.
New hubs/authorities scores can be computed (Table 8) and they show a much higher degree
of symmetry by stressing even more the important role of banks in the Italian network.
New companies enter among the most relevant, ENEL Spa and Exor, a financial holding
Table 6: TOPHITS model (2 layers, r = 12.) [Poligrafici]
company hubs score company authority score
Poligrafici Prin 0.27396 Poligrafici Edit 0.31366
Poligrafica San 0.27394 Poligrafici Prin 0.24499
Poligrafici Edit 0.26587 Poligrafica San 0.24497
Monrif Spa 0.14185 Noemalife Spa 0.010925
Finmeccanica Spa 0.0045832 Bolzoni Spa 0.010913
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Table 7: TOPHITS model (2 layers, r = 17.) [ENI]
company hubs score company authority score
Eni Spa 0.17295 Saipem Spa 0.14147
Italmobiliare 0.075896 Snam Spa 0.13879
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.071711 Ansaldo Sts Spa 0.059603
Finmeccanica Spa 0.066764 Eurotech Spa 0.059328
Premafin Finanz 0.055171 Rcs Mediagroup 0.050548
controlled by the Agnelli family. Apparently, Enel and Exor are among the leaders not only in
terms of ownership, but also as drivers of market prices.
Table 8: Hubs/Authorities score in the TOPHITS model (3 layers)
company hubs score company authority score
Intesa Sanpaolo 0.044282 Intesa Sanpaolo 0.043007
Unicredit Spa 0.043979 Generali Assic 0.042384
Generali Assic 0.042652 Unicredit Spa 0.042056
Mediolanum Spa 0.042345 Mediolanum Spa 0.041021
Banca Pop Emilia 0.041979 Banca Pop Emilia 0.04018
Ubi Banca Scpa 0.041854 Ubi Banca Scpa 0.039772
Enel Spa 0.040269 Enel Spa 0.038583
Mediobanca 0.038018 Exor 0.037093
Exor 0.038014 Eni Spa 0.035045
Banca Pop Sondri 0.035452 Atlantia Spa 0.034714
6 Conclusions and further research
The univariate and multivariate analyses, carried on in this paper, have brought to the following
results:
i. As far as ownership is concerned, the core of shareholding is composed of banks and
financial institutions. Eight out of the ten most relevant companies are banks or insurance
companies. Fiat and Pirelli & Co. are the only exceptions.
ii. From the board of directors network side, the most central ones are industrial companies:
Pirelli, the most central, shares its directors with eighteen other companies.
iii. A few industrial groups emerge: Pirelli, Fiat, Caltagirone, Premafin, Poligrafici, Enel,
Finmeccanica and ENI. These groups are family companies or ex-state owned companies
with a still strong public participation.
iv. Mediobanca is definitely the Italian leader in CG, present in all industrial and financial
groups, or at least the most relevant in terms of participation.
v. The effect of CG on market performance is practically null. A common driver, probably
due to the strong economic crisis as of April 2012 – April 2013, is leading the market.
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vi. A further time analysis could possibly show whether this scarce relevance of shareholding
and boards on the market performance is contingent phenomenon or, on the contrary, is
persistent.
The results show clearly that the successful way to analyze complex interrelations is by
multi–way analysis. In particular, corporate governance cannot be understood unless owner-
ship and management are taken simultaneously. In multi–way analysis, more modes can be
added, like we did with price correlations, thus shading new light on the relationship between
management and control and the market. More research can be done introducing the time
effect, thereby having a clearer picture of the evolution of power.
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